While not taking St. Anselm’s ontological argument in the Proslogion to be valid, this paper shows that the dismissal of the thesis by both St. Thomas Aquinas and Kant does less than justice to St. Anselm’s text. In Chapter II of the Proslogion Anselm defines God as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, claiming that this notion ‘exists in the mind’. The question is does its subject, God, exist ‘in re’. Can one proceed from the mental existence to (...) real existence given that to exist in re is greater than to exist notionally? This paper sets out several of Anselm’s premises from which he concludes that the notional existence of God defined by Anselm entails God’s actual existence, Aquinas dismissed Anselm’s arguments – possibly not having Anselm’s full text at hand. Anselm maintains that if ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’ can be conceived, then to deny its existence in re constitutes a self-contradiction. The present paper examines in detail the elements of which Anselm’s elegant arguments are composed: q.v. Reference is made to Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, and to Anselm’s ontology set out in Monologion. Much, for the modern reader, turns on the topical logic of ‘perfection’ and of ‘greatness’. Again: much turns on the Kantian question ‘Is existence a predicate?’ And on the question: what kinds of things can be the subject of predicates? The comparison which Anselm is making between real and conceptual existence is not like any other comparison. This may be the flaw in his arguments. (shrink)

THE methodological principle known as Ockham’s Razor is usually formulated as “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessarium”. However, it is well known that neither this formulation of the principle nor the idea behind it come originally from William of Ockham. This particular formula is due to Leibniz, though Ockham’s works contain equivalent formulas: “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”; “Si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere aliam rem”; “Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora”. But (...) Duns Scotus had also used the same principle before Ockham and he refers it directly to Aristotle. If the Razor belongs to anyone then, it belongs to Aristotle, and the study of its exact meaning and value must begin with Aristotle’s views about it. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the principle was recognized as Aristotle’s at least until the time of Galileo. Thus in his Dialogue concerning the Two chief World Systems Galileo supports his theory that “diurnal motion belongs to the earth alone rather than to the rest of the universe excepting the earth” by referring to “a very true maxim of Aristotle’s which teaches that ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’.”. (shrink)

In the _Proslogion_, St. Anselm presents a philosophical argument for the existence of God. Anselm's proof, known since the time of Kant as the ontological argument for the existence of God, has played an important role in the history of philosophy and has been incorporated in various forms into the systems of Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and others. Included in this edition of the_ Proslogion _are Gaunilo's "A Reply on Behalf of the Fool" and St. Anselm's "The Author's Reply to Gaunilo." (...) All three works are in the original Latin with English translation on facing pages. Professor Charlesworth's introduction provides a helpful discussion of the context of the _Proslogion_ in the theological tradition and in Anselm's own thought and writing. (shrink)

THE methodological principle known as Ockham’s Razor is usually formulated as “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessarium”. However, it is well known that neither this formulation of the principle nor the idea behind it come originally from William of Ockham. This particular formula is due to Leibniz, though Ockham’s works contain equivalent formulas: “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”; “Si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere aliam rem”; “Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora”. But (...) Duns Scotus had also used the same principle before Ockham and he refers it directly to Aristotle. If the Razor belongs to anyone then, it belongs to Aristotle, and the study of its exact meaning and value must begin with Aristotle’s views about it. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the principle was recognized as Aristotle’s at least until the time of Galileo. Thus in his Dialogue concerning the Two chief World Systems Galileo supports his theory that “diurnal motion belongs to the earth alone rather than to the rest of the universe excepting the earth” by referring to “a very true maxim of Aristotle’s which teaches that ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’.”. (shrink)

IN Chapter 6 of the Poetics Aristotle defines tragedy as.

The word for Professor Else’s book is “monumental”. It is monumental in size, monumental in its scope, in its scholarship and erudition, and in its general mastery of the most difficult of all Aristotle’s texts, the Poetics. And, in case this should give the impression that the book is over–solemn and pedantic, it may be remarked that Professor Else carries this monumental air lightly and easily; he writes with verve and shows a nice commonsense as he moves among the complexities (...) of Aristotle’s text and the complexities worse complicated of the commentators on the Poetics. In short, we now have a definitive commentary in English on Aristotle’s Poetics to take the place of the very unsatisfactory interpretations of Butcher and Bywater. (shrink)

The word for Professor Else’s book is “monumental”. It is monumental in size, monumental in its scope, in its scholarship and erudition, and in its general mastery of the most difficult of all Aristotle’s texts, the Poetics. And, in case this should give the impression that the book is over–solemn and pedantic, it may be remarked that Professor Else carries this monumental air lightly and easily; he writes with verve and shows a nice commonsense as he moves among the complexities (...) of Aristotle’s text and the complexities worse complicated of the commentators on the Poetics. In short, we now have a definitive commentary in English on Aristotle’s Poetics to take the place of the very unsatisfactory interpretations of Butcher and Bywater. (shrink)

Professor Körner’s essay on what he calls conceptual thinking is much more extensive in scope than its title suggests. Körner begins with a “logical”—as opposed to epistemological or psychological—discussion of the different kinds of concepts, “ostensive” and “non-ostensive”, and defines a concept as a sign used in accordance with rules. These rules, he emphasises, are not purely conventional, derived either from artificial formal languages or from “ordinary language” as the Linguistic Analysts claim. Thus he says that the claim of the (...) Analysts that a proposition is meaningless unless it has a role in ordinary language,” presupposes a criterion to decide whether, if a proposition cannot be expressed in some language, it is the proposition which is defective and not merely the language”. Körner’s position, therefore, differs in this respect from that of the Analysts, although his method is similar to theirs in that he claims that his enquiry is a purely neutral “logical” one involving no metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions or commitments and, in a sense, having no direct metaphysical or epistemological repercussions one way or the other. So, for example, when he says that an ostensive concept must have a “basis”,—that is, something to which it is applied—he does not mean that a concept, to be meaningful, must designate some ostensible “instance”. Thus, he admits, an Idealist might deny that there is any “instance” corresponding to the concept “physical object” while, nevertheless, acknowledging that his fountain pen is a “basis” of the concept “physical object”. In other words, Körner’s definition of the concept does not either directly sanction or rule out the Idealist epistemological position. (shrink)

Professor Körner’s essay on what he calls conceptual thinking is much more extensive in scope than its title suggests. Körner begins with a “logical”—as opposed to epistemological or psychological—discussion of the different kinds of concepts, “ostensive” and “non-ostensive”, and defines a concept as a sign used in accordance with rules. These rules, he emphasises, are not purely conventional, derived either from artificial formal languages or from “ordinary language” as the Linguistic Analysts claim. Thus he says that the claim of the (...) Analysts that a proposition is meaningless unless it has a role in ordinary language,” presupposes a criterion to decide whether, if a proposition cannot be expressed in some language, it is the proposition which is defective and not merely the language”. Körner’s position, therefore, differs in this respect from that of the Analysts, although his method is similar to theirs in that he claims that his enquiry is a purely neutral “logical” one involving no metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions or commitments and, in a sense, having no direct metaphysical or epistemological repercussions one way or the other. So, for example, when he says that an ostensive concept must have a “basis”,—that is, something to which it is applied—he does not mean that a concept, to be meaningful, must designate some ostensible “instance”. Thus, he admits, an Idealist might deny that there is any “instance” corresponding to the concept “physical object” while, nevertheless, acknowledging that his fountain pen is a “basis” of the concept “physical object”. In other words, Körner’s definition of the concept does not either directly sanction or rule out the Idealist epistemological position. (shrink)